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Rule 26.1 Certification
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, amicus
Physician Hospitals of America makes the following disclosure: Amicus is a
nonprofit association representing physician-owned hospitals. It is not
publicly owned, has no parent corporation, subsidiary, or affiliate, and has
not issued shares or debt securities to the public. As a result, no publicly
held company owns 10 percent or more of the stock of PHA.
Counsel certifies that he believes that the Amended Certificates of
Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Appellants
and Appellees would be complete with the addition of the following:
Physician Hospitals of America, amicus curiae
Victor Moldovan, counsel to amicus curiae
Scott C. Oostdyk, counsel to amicus curiae
Robert L. Hodges, counsel to amicus curiae
H. Carter Redd, counsel to amicus curiae
Lisa M. Sharp, counsel to amicus curiae
Matthew D. Fender, counsel to amicus curiae

/s/ Victor L. Moldovan__
Victor L. Moldovan
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Interest of the Amicus
Physician Hospitals of America (“PHA”) is a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6)
organization formed to educate members of the physician-owned hospital
community about regulatory and legislative issues and to encourage PHA
members to advocate for the rights of physician-owned hospitals. PHA has
approximately 166 member hospitals in 34 different states, comprising both
existing facilities and physician-owned hospitals in various stages of
development. PHA-member hospitals are typically enrolled as providers
under Medicare and Medicaid programs, with up to 70% of their case mix
stemming from Medicare and Medicaid patients. The physician owners of
PHA-member hospitals are also providers under Medicare and Medicaid.
PHA is committed to the sanctity of private property as guaranteed by
the Constitution, especially the rights of physicians to own and operate
hospitals and to provide patients with expert, cost-effective, and efficient
health care. PHA contends that § 6001 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”), Pub L. No. 11-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), retroactively prohibits planned, approved, and commenced facility
expansion at approximately 58 Medicare-certified hospitals solely because
they are owned by physicians, and further prevents the development of an
additional 84 physician-owned hospitals that would be otherwise eligible for

1

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/12/2011

Page: 6 of 19

Medicare certification. See Physician Hospitals of America, et al. v.
Sebelius, Case No. 6:10-cv-00277-MHS, filed June 3, 2010, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.
PHA has an interest in protecting its members directly, and the public
indirectly, from any unconstitutional healthcare legislation, and thus it has
an interest in supporting the Appellees in this action. PHA’s membership is
further harmed each day this litigation continues. PHA’s members are
American citizens who wish to invest their personal capital to expand their
businesses, create jobs, and serve the public. They are prevented from doing
so by the specter of an ultra vires act of Congress.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), amicus curiae
certifies that counsel for the Department of Justice on behalf of the
Department of Health and Social Services for Appellants, counsel for the
States-Appellees, and counsel for the Private Plaintiffs-Appellees, have
consented to the filing of this brief. This brief amicus curiae was written
entirely by PHA’s counsel, and no person apart from those identified in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5)(C) made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2
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Argument
PHA agrees with the district court and the States that § 1501 of
PPACA exceeds Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Granting the unconstitutionality of that section of the Act for the sake of
argument, PHA focuses here on the district court’s ruling on severability.
For the reasons set forth below, PHA urges this Court to affirm the district
court’s declaration that PPACA is unconstitutional in its entirety.
I.

The District Court’s Ruling on Severance Was Correct.
Having concluded that the individual mandate was invalid, the district

court had three logically possible choices: sever § 1501 from the whole and
strike it alone, strike more than just § 1501 by parsing through the statute to
determine severance on a provision-by-provision basis, or refuse to sever
§ 1501 and strike the statute in its entirety. The court made the only
constitutionally defensible choice consistent with Congressional intent in
declaring PPACA unconstitutional in its entirety.
A.

Congress Did Not Intend Section 1501 To Be Severed From
PPACA’s Remaining Provisions.

No party before this Court is arguing that the district court should
have severed only § 1501 from PPACA. Applicable case law and the text of
the Act itself demonstrate why it would be wholly improper to sever only
§ 1501. First, Supreme Court precedent requires that, for severance to be

3
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defensible, the remaining provisions of the law must remain “fully operative
as a law” absent the invalid provision. Free Enter. Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010). In making this
determination, courts consider whether the remaining statutory provisions
“will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.” Alaska
Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987).
Here, no one contends that a PPACA without an individual insurance
mandate would “function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress” because it is accepted that a “health insurance market could never
survive or even form if people could buy their insurance on the way to the
hospital,” and Congress knew this when creating PPACA. See Appellant’s
Br. at 36 (citing 47 Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Hall).
Second, § 1501 expressly identifies the centrality of the Individual
Mandate to PPACA’s other provisions, stating:
[I]f there were no requirement [to purchase health insurance],
many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until
they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance
coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of
this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the
health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement is
essential to creating effective health insurance markets … .
Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010) (emphasis
added). In light of Congress’s own statement that the Individual Mandate is
4
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an essential piece of an intentionally bundled-together group of provisions,
there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended the residual of PPACA
to survive if only § 1501 were stricken as unconstitutional. Thus, a decision
to sever only § 1501 from PPACA would conflict with Supreme Court
authority on severance as well as evidence of Congress’s intent in enacting
PPACA as a complete package.
B.

Striking More Than Just § 1501 but Not the Whole Statute Is
Neither Legally Permissible Nor Even Feasible.

It is conceivable that other severance cases involved statutes that
accommodated an easy “save this, strike that” approach to severance:
PPACA is simply not in that category. Section 1501 itself is a linchpin
provision of an Act that involved a delicate and opaque balancing of
interests among members of Congress, who passed the statute by the
slimmest of majorities. It would be, therefore, an improvident project for
any court to guess at which provisions were not part of an unrecorded quid
pro quo that enabled the statute as a whole to pass through Congress.
Moreover, the proper inquiry is not whether any residual provision could
stand on its own, but rather whether the residual “will function in a manner
consistent with the intent of Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684-85.
Because Congress has not made a practice of creating a record that might
inform a court about what various constellations of potentially residual
5
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provisions would function in a manner consistent with its intent, any court’s
warrant to cobble together some-but-not-other of PPACA’s provisions
would necessarily rely on the most speculative evidence. Further, as argued
above, that approach would contradict the Act’s plain statement that § 1501
was enacted to function “together with the other provisions of this Act.”
Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010).
As both Appellants and two district courts that have considered this
question have recognized, parsing through PPACA’s residual provisions
with the aim of determining which subset “will function in a manner
consistent with [Congress’s] intent” would require the courts to do nothing
less than unscramble the legislative omelet. See Florida v. U. S. Dept. of
Health and Human Svcs., No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 at
*132 (N.D. Fl. Jan. 31, 2011 )(“Severing the individual mandate from the
Act along with the other insurance reform provisions -- and in the process
reconfiguring an exceedingly lengthy and comprehensive legislative scheme
-- cannot be done.”); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d. 768, 790 (E.D.
Va. 2010)(“It would be virtually impossible within the present record to
determine whether Congress would have passed this bill, encompassing a
wide variety of topics related and unrelated to heath care, without Section
1501.”). Furthermore, this Court has several times declined the invitation to

6
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usurp the legislature’s role and rewrite a statute in order to save it. See, e.g.,
Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001)(“We
will not, however, rewrite the clear terms of a statute in order to reject a
facial challenge.”); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir.
2000)(“[T]he role of the judicial branch is to apply statutory language, not to
rewrite it.”).
As this Court has recognized, rewriting a statute in order to salvage it
usurps the legislative function. See Harris, 216 F.3d at 976. Not only
would a “parsing” approach to severance revise statutory law without
conforming to Constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment, but it would also encourage Congress to rely on the judicial
branch to wield the equivalent of a line-item veto in the guise of
“severance.” As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, our Constitutional
procedures for enacting statutes “were the product of the great debates and
compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical
materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to
enact statutes may only be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 439-440 (1998). The procedure the government proposes for the
scope of severance here has none of those qualities.

7
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Declaring PPACA Unconstitutional as a Whole Is the Only Legally
Defensible Decision.
Any suggestion that Congress believed itself to be on solid

constitutional footing when enacting the individual mandate of § 1501 could
not be said with a straight face. Not only did Congress build in a judicial
review period by making § 1501 effective in 2014, but its legal researchers
also unambiguously foretold that the mandate faced an uncertain future in
the courts. See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *71 (noting that
“Congress’ attorneys in the Congressional Research Service (‘CRS’) and
Congressional Budget Office (‘CBO’) advised long before the Act was
passed into law, that the notion of Congress having the power under the
Commerce Clause to directly impose an individual mandate to purchase
health care insurance is ‘novel’ and ‘unprecedented.’”)(further citation
omitted).
With and despite this apparent knowledge, Congress elected not to
guide the federal courts’ decision as to severance by including a severability
provision. It is difficult to view those facts in combination and not conclude
that Congress opted either to risk the viability of the Act as a whole, or to
prompt a judicial determination of what provisions it intended to link to the
individual mandate. If the former is true, then the government must live
with the consequence of that decision and accept that PPACA must fail as a
8
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whole. If the latter is true, this Court should decline the invitation to make
hard choices that Congress declined to make for itself using only guesswork
as to Congressional intent with respect to a mish-mosh statute.
In the usual case where Congress includes a severability clause or
provision, the courts apply a presumption of severability. Alaska Airlines,
480 U.S. at 686. PPACA, however, lacks a severability provision, so there
is no such presumption. Id. Moreover, not only did Congress fail to include
a severability provision, but the statute’s legislative history indicates that this
failure was intentional because an earlier version of the Act included a
severability clause. See H.R. 3962, section 255. “Where Congress includes
[express] language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to
enactment, it may be presumed that the [omitted provision] was not
intended.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). Thus,
where normally Congress’s failure to include a severability clause is
perceived as mere Congressional “silence” on the subject, see Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686, here the Court may consider the Congressional
decision to exclude a severability clause as evidence of Congressional intent
that PPACA should stand or fall as a whole on the constitutionality of its
core provisions.

9
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Accordingly, because the record does not show that the remaining
provisions of PPACA were intended to be “fully operative as a law” absent
the Individual Mandate, and it is not “evident” that Congress would have
enacted PPACA’s remaining provisions independent of its unconstitutional
package of wide-ranging health-care industry reforms, the only proper
approach here is to strike the statute in its entirety. See Free Enter. Fund,
130 S. Ct. at 3161.
III.

The Government’s Approach to Severence is Unprecedented and
Would Create an Unworkable Patchwork of Uncertain Non-severed
Provisions by District and Circuit.
For the first time in this case, the government argues that a two-stage

process should guide the scope of PPACA’s severance. In stage one, the
district court would determine which PPACA provisions “burden parties to
the litigation,” because the government contends that only those provisions
even qualify for severance consideration. Appellant’s Br. at 59-60. None of
the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on severance–Alaska Airlines, Free
Enterprise Fund, or Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006)–
contemplate this approach. This idea is manufactured from dicta in Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), a case that cursorily considered the
scope of severance with respect to a state statute.

10
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The government further asserts that this preliminary determination of
what provisions would qualify for severance consideration could exclude
even provisions integrally related to an unconstitutional provision.
Appellant’s Br. at 59 (“Moreover, even when particular provisions are
integrally related, a court may not address provisions that do not burden
parties to the litigation.”). That extreme argument is made not only without
any authority but also in contravention of existing authority. Specifically, in
Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court instructed that courts should be
guided in their severance determinations by evidence from the Legislature
that certain provisions would not have been enacted independent of the
unconstitutional provision. 130 S.Ct. at 3161. This can only mean that any
provision “integrally related” to an unconstitutional provision should be
subject to severance, because such provisions “would not have been enacted
independent of the unconstitutional provision.” Id. Thus, the government’s
suggested approach ignores binding authority.
In the second stage of the government’s hoped-for process, district
courts would engage in “a close analysis of Congressional intent” to
determine whether the however-many remaining provisions that do burden
the parties and are otherwise “unobjectionable” were intended by Congress

11
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to “stand alone and function independently. * Appellant’s Br. at 57.
Notably, the government declines to identify to this Court exactly which
provisions of PPACA even arguably meet those criteria.
If the government’s approach were adopted, federal courts would be
making at least two determinations to define the proper scope of severance:
first as to provisions that burden the parties, second as to Congressional
intent regarding the independent functionality of the residual. That approach
to severance would practically guarantee the creation of very different
PPACA rump statutes by district and circuit. Until the Supreme Court
would settle the severance question with finality, the country would have to
suffer an unmanageable and uncertain hodge-podge of differing—and
costly—provisions. The government does not make this result clear, but it is
foreseeable, and gives this Court ample reason to reject that approach.
Conclusion
The court below properly entered judgment declaring PPACA
unconstitutional and void in its entirety. In so doing, the court avoided the
pitfalls of producing hybrid legislation which does violence to the separation

*

There is no authority cited to illuminate what constitutes an “unobjectionable” provision
as used in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). If this Court were to order
remand and an evaluation of severance on a provision-by-provision basis, due process
would entitle PHA and other affected persons to a hearing on their objections to
constitutionally infirm provision of PPACA before the court determines that any
individual section is “unobjectionable” and therefore not subject to severance.
12
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of powers and fails to accomplish stated congressional purposes. For these
reasons, your amicus urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the district
court, nullify PPACA in its entirety, and prohibit its enforcement.
Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Victor L. Moldovan
Victor L. Moldovan
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
1170 Peachtree Street N.E.
Suite 2100
Atlanta, GA 30309
(404) 443-5708
Scott C. Oostdyk
Robert L. Hodges
H. Carter Redd
Lisa M. Sharp
Matthew D. Fender
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
One James Center
901 E. Cary St.
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 775-1000
Counsel for Physician
Hospitals of America
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Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(a)
I hereby certify that according to the word-count feature provided in
Microsoft Word 2003, excluding only the portions of the brief exempted by
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), that the foregoing brief contains 2,707
words. The text of the brief is composed in Times New Roman 14 point
font.
/s/ Victor L. Moldovan__
Victor L. Moldovan
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on May 11, 2011, I filed the foregoing brief with
the Court by causing an original and six copies to be delivered to the Clerk
by hand delivery. I further certify that, by consent of the parties, I have
caused the brief to be served by electronic mail and by U.S. first-class mail
upon the following counsel:
Eric B. Beckenhauer, Esq.
U.S. Department of Justice
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530
eric.beckenhauer@usdoj.gov
Scott Douglas Makar, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General of Florida
The Capitol PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399
scott.makar@myfloridalegal.com
Gregory Katsas, Esq.
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001-2105
ggkatsas@jonesday.com
Further, an identical electronic copy of the brief shall be uploaded to the
Court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically generate and send by
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to all registered attorneys participating in the case.
/s/ Victor L. Moldovan__
Victor L. Moldovan
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